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Abstract
This paper studies a spatial model of electronic business network formation
where firms build links based on a cost-benefit analysis. Benefits result from di-
rectly and indirectly connected firms in terms of knowledge flows, which are hetero-
geneous: a “key-player” (e.g. a firm providing an exchange platform in a business-
to-business network) provides a higher level of knowledge flows than “peripheral”
firms (e.g. tier 3 suppliers in a vertically differentiated industry). For intermediate
cost values of link formation, stable and efficient network structures comprise only
a subset of the total set of firms, excluding peripheral firms which are most dis-
tantly located to the key player. When link formation implies a certain degree of
network congestion, the stable and efficient network size is smaller than in a model
with bilateral decisions upon link formation between two firms.
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1 Introduction
The design and organization of network structures play an important role in
significant economic and social relationships. Informal social networks are
often the means for communicating information and allocating goods and ser-
vices which are not traded on markets. Such goods do not only comprise
invitations to parties and other forms of exchanging friendship but also, e.g.
in the context of electronic business networks where co-operation is a central
competition factor, information about job openings, business opportunities or
product development. More than ever firms depend on connecting their abili-
ties and resources with those from external partners. Networks play a funda-
mental role in providing platforms for research and development and collusive
alliances among corporations. Furthermore, they determine how information
is exchanged and convey social capital as one of the important determinants
in trade.
For several decades, the management of the external environment took a
high priority for firms by building stronger relationships with customers and
suppliers. Recently, organizations have moved beyond customer/supplier con-
nections to begin to establish alliances even with their competitors, which is -
among other reasons - due to the revolution in information technology which
has brought organizational changes that modify transaction costs, and thereby
affect both the horizontal structure and the vertical configuration of industries.
In this context, three lines of research can be distinguished:1 First, there is
a reduction in the frequency of hierarchical coordination, which is due to an
increasing fragmentation of value chains. The advances in information tech-
nology, which cut coordination and monitoring costs, facilitated codification
of knowledge and reduced the importance of geographical distance, at least for
some activities. In this way, the new technology has reduced internalization-
based advantages and reversed the process of vertical integration. Market-
based transactions have squeezed out some of the ones hitherto coordinated
hierarchically. The key-players in an increasing number of industries have
adopted modular organizational structures. Hierarchically coordinated, verti-
cally integrated organizations have thus given way to network organizations
marked by horizontal cooperation, reciprocity and mutual trust, instead of
hierarchical supervision of work processes.
1See Szalavetz (2003).
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Second, there is a flattening of vertically integrated organizations due to
the mounting importance of distributed knowledge. In intellectual capitalism
however, a diminishing proportion of the relevant knowledge base remains
internal in many industries, and an increasing part is provided by outside
experts. The more specialized the knowledge of an actor, the greater the
extent to which hierarchical coordination loses its hold. This is especially the
case for multi-component, IT-intensive products like aircraft engines, power
stations, or office safety systems, which incorporate a plurality of technologies,
and firms cannot develop them all inside. The manufacturers of such products
and systems integrate the knowledge and coordinate the activity of various
external, specialized suppliers and research institutions.
Networks as a third type of coordination alongside markets and hierar-
chies are becoming increasingly common in economic activity. Sustainable
competitive advantage is determined by factors other than the traditional
determinants of corporate competitiveness. Companies now have to capitalize
on their internal as well as external knowledge. Alliance business networks
also demonstrate sparsity, decentralization and clustering. Interfirm networks
tend to be extremely sparse since forming and maintaining alliances has a
cost in terms of time and effort. When firms forge relationships with other
organizations for information sharing and exchange of knowledge, they face
a variety of search, monitoring, and enforcement costs. Monitoring and
managing alliances is also complex and costly, causing the firm’s effectiveness
at managing its alliances to decline with the number of alliances maintained.2
Thus, due to cost constraints in forging and maintaining links, interfirm
networks will tend to have far fewer links than if all pairs of firms were directly
connected. Hence, although there is a growing importance of maintaining
links to competitors, suppliers or clients in electronic business networks,
there are cost factors that prevent many links. Moreover, we often observe
networks being formed around certain key-players, often excluding smaller or
peripheral firms because those players do not provide sufficient knowledge for
the network. This paper therefore analyzes the interplay between network
benefits and hindering costs of network formation, when players provide
heterogeneous benefits to external partners.
2See Deeds and Hill (1996).
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Related literature: An excellent overview on relevant contributions
to the theory of network formation is provided by Jackson (2004). Related
models of network formation and collaborative networks are found in Bala
and Goyal (2000), Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), and Kranton and Minehart
(2001). Bala and Goyal (2000) follow a significantly different approach than
this paper since they consider a directed network model where individuals are
able to connect to others without the consent of the connected individual.
Controversially, this paper deals with non-directed networks requiring the
consent of both involved individuals to successfully create a link. The work of
Kranton and Minehart (2001) deals with networks between vertically related
firms. Issues relating to group formation and cooperation have been a central
concern in economics and game theory in particular. The traditional approach
to these issues has been in terms of coalitions. In recent years, there has
been considerable work on coalition formation in games; see e.g. Jackson and
Watts (2002), Bloch (1995). One application of this theory is the formation
of groups in oligopolies. In this literature, group formation is modeled in
terms of a coalition structure which is a partition of the set of firms. The
present paper contributes to the theory of network formation by introducing
three aspects which are especially observable in electronic business networks.
First, we account for the fact that a crucial feature of such electronic business
networks is the participation of so-called “key-players”, such as crucial value
enhancers in value chains or precursors in product development alliances. Ac-
cordingly, we account for heterogeneity among firms’ information contribution
to networks. Key-players provide higher levels of knowledge than “ordinary”
firms, which could be tier 2 suppliers in value chains or followers in R&D
development consortia. Second, in our model, firms can only connect to their
direct neighbors but not to more distant players. This assumption reflects the
peculiarities of electronic business networks where it is not necessarily required
that every network member has a direct link to all other participants in order
to guarantee knowledge exchange flows between all participants. A further
intuition behind this assumption is that distances are interpreted in terms
of similarities in business activities. That means if a firm intents to join a
network, it has to incur costs (e.g. adjustment costs for its database, training
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of personnel) in order to sample a neighbor which is member of the network.
On the other hand, the existing network must incur corresponding adjustment
costs. The utility from a connection to a direct industry competitor might
be higher than the utility from a very distant network member, say from
another industry. Third, we introduce network congestion costs into a model
of network formation. A joining member imposes costs on all existing network
members in terms of increasing communication costs or adjustment costs,
causing a firm’s effectiveness at managing its alliances to decline with the
number of alliances maintained.3
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the assumptions
of the network model are introduced in section 2. Section 3 determines
stability and efficiency in the static model. In section 4 we specify the
outcomes of a dynamic network formation process. Section 5 discusses some
extensions to the model and section 6 concludes the paper.
3See Deeds and Hill (1996).
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2 The Basic Network Model
The present model extends the literature on network formation in various
aspects. Closest related is the “connections model” by Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996).4 There is a finite set of N = 1, ...,m, ..., n firms in a market (with
n ≥ 4) which have a fixed location on a circle and are equidistantly located.
This spatial dispersion should be interpreted to represent some diversity in
terms of professional distance, differences in industry affiliations, etc. between
the firms.5
A business network g is a list of firms which are linked to each other.
Firms are represented by nodes and a link between nodes indicates that two
firms are directly connected. This paper focusses on non-directed networks
where links are bilateral. Every firm can only connect to (one or both of) its
two direct neighbors. This can be interpreted as follows: if a firm wants to
join a network, then it would have to adjust its database or its information
technology infrastructure in such a way that it is compatible with the existing
network. This happens for example by adjusting the database to the network
member with the most similar database to the joining firm, which is (because
of the spatial dispersion) one of the direct neighbors. We write ij ∈ g for the
link between the firms i and j which are direct neighbors.
Each firm i ∈ {1, ..., n} receives a benefit ui(g) from the network g in terms
of communication of information and from the allocation of goods and services
which are not traded in markets (information about business opportunities,
know-how on information technology, etc.). Although firms may connect only
to their immediate neighbors, they also benefit from indirect communication
flows with those firms to whom their direct neighbors are linked, and so on.
The value of communication or knowledge flows obtained from other firms di-
minishes in the distance to those players, represented by a spatial depreciation
rate 0 < δ < 1, which captures the idea that the value that i derives from a con-
nection to j is proportional to the distance between those two firms. Further,
4See also Jackson and Watts (2002) and Jackson (2004), who provide descriptions on the
common structures of models on network formation.
5Note, that some contributions deal with players that are located on the real line, e.g.
Johnson and Gilles (2000). In these models, players located at the end of the line only have
one direct neighbor, which would lead to an ex-ante asymmetry of firms. To rule this out,
we use a circular model where every firm has two direct neighbors.
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there is an “intrinsic value” wij ≥ 0, firm i provides to firm j.6 In what follows
it is assumed that all firms are identical except for one so-called “key-player”
k, which provides a higher value than all other firms (this could be interpreted
as k being a technology leader, or a platform provider in an electronic business
network). Without loss of generality, we assume that wij = 1, ∀i 6= k and
wkj >
1
1−δ − δ.7 For notational purposes, wkj is labeled wk in the following.
The net utility of each firm i from graph g is then given by
ui(g) =
 δlikwk +
∑
j 6=i δ
lij , for i 6= k∑
j 6=i δ
lkj , for i = k
(1)
where lij is the number of links in the shortest path between firm i and firm
j (if there is no path between i and j, set δlij = 0). The total cost of a link
between two firms is c. The value of a link is determined by the benefits the
two link establishing players receive through this link.
i= 1
i = 3
i = k
i = n
i = 4
1
2
w
kd
+ d
- c
2d
- c
Figure 1: Circular network setup
Figure 1 depicts the setup of the model with a randomly selected position of
the key-player k at i = 2. All firms are supposed to be initially unconnected.
The graph also shows the value of two randomly selected links (given that
there are no other links), for the case that those links are the only two existing
links in the network. Link 1 between i = 1 and the key-player i = k has a total
value of δ(1+wk)− c, where δwk(> δ) is the net value to player i = 1 and δ is
the net value to the key-player k. Link 2 is a link between two non-key-players
which has the value 2δ − c.
6See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for a similar notion.
7By wkj > 11−δ − δ it is guaranteed that the increase in utility due to the proximity to
the key-player is higher than the increase in utility due to an increase of the network size.
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3 Efficiency and Stability in the Static Model
Let us define the efficient network as the graph that maximizes the total sur-
plus function. This is the network g∗ that maximizes the sum of each firm’s
benefit from the network, accordingly g∗ = arg maxg
∑n
i=1 ui(g).
8 Without
loss of generality, in the following we assume that n is even. The common
notion of pairwise stability by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is not totally ap-
propriate to network formation in electronic business, since it does not allow
for interfirm compensation. Indeed, we often observe firms subsidizing suppli-
ers or customers so that they adopt common e-business solutions, given that
the joint profit of both firms is higher than the cost of establishing this con-
nection. Accordingly, the following notion of joint pairwise stability describes
a network as stable when no pair of adjacent players would benefit by severing
an existing link, and no two players would benefit by forming a new link.
Definition 1 A network g is jointly pairwise stable, if
(i) ∀ij ∈ g, ui(g) + uj(g)− c ≥ ui(g − ij) + uj(g − ij), and
(ii) ∀ij 6∈ g, ui(g) + uj(g)− c < ui(g − ij) + uj(g − ij).
Definition 1 thus states that a link is jointly pairwise stable, so that this link is
formed when the sum of both agents’ additional values from the link is higher
than the sum of their utilities if the link was not formed, where c denotes
the total cost of the link. Contrarily, if the sum of the utilities of both link
establishing firms is less than without the link, the notion requires that the
link is not formed. When a network g is not jointly pairwise stable it is said
to be defeated by g′ if either g′ = g + ij and (ii) is violated for ij, or if
g′ = g − ij and (i) is violated for ij. As in the model by Watts (2001) the
approval of two firms is required for the formation of a link, but here, those
firms have to be adjacent, and the sum of both their utilities minus the cost
c of the link creation have to be (weakly) higher than 0. The consideration
of the joint utilities of link establishing players introduces the possibility of
interfirm compensation. Indeed, in electronic business relationships we observe
that many firms subsidize their suppliers to get them connected to a business
network.
8See Watts (2001), Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bala and Goyal (2000).
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This definition of joint pairwise stability is a relatively weak notion among
those which account for link formation, and it is not dependent on any par-
ticular formation process. Accordingly, it admits for a relatively large set of
stable allocations compared to more restrictive definitions or an explicit for-
mation procedure. But for our purposes, it already narrows the set of graphs
substantially, and therefore such a weak definition provides strong results. One
obvious strengthening of this stability notion is to allow a decision on the cre-
ation of links to be made by coalitions of network members, which include
more than two firms (which are connected via the link). This definition of a
stable network (i.e. equilibrium) requires that agents have no incentives to
sever existing links, or establish fresh ones, or replace existing links with new
ones.
Proposition 1 For all N an efficient and stable network exists. Further,
(i) if c ≤ 2δ +∑n−1i=2 δi + δ n2 (wk − 1) := a, then the network gN , that
comprises all n players is efficient and stable.
(ii) If a < c ≤ δ(1 + wk + δ) := b, then for every c ∃m such that the
network is efficient and stable for m firms, with 0 < m < n and m
being an odd integer. This network comprises k.
(iii) If c > b, then the empty network is the only efficient and stable
network structure.
Proof. (i). In order to determine the lower threshold value a, we define vl
as the lowest value of a link in the largest possible network. This link connects
the last unconnected player, that is most distantly located to the key-player.
The value of this link is determined by
vl = 2δ +
n−1∑
i=2
δi + δ
n
2 (wk − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=a
−c. (2)
The two firms that establish the link each receive δ from their direct con-
nection, and the new network member additionally receives δ
n
2wk from the
indirect connection to the key-player and
∑n−1
i=2 δ
i− δ n2 from all other indirect
connections. If vl > 0 (which is the case if c < a), even the last unconnected
firm and its neighbor will benefit from creating a link.
(ii). and (iii). The relevant link value to determine the upper threshold
value b is the highest link value in the smallest possible network, which is the
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network comprising the key-player and its two direct neighbors.9 This link has
the value
vh = δ(1 + wk + δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=b
−c. (3)
The second neighbor who links up to k receives δwk from the direct link to k
and δ2 from the indirect connection to the other neighbor. k receives δ from
the link to the joining member - the cost of this link is c. If c is higher than
this value, only the empty network can be efficient.10 If c lies between the
two threshold values a and b, then the efficient network structure necessarily
comprises the key-player k but does not include all n firms but only m < n
firms, where m is an odd integer, due to symmetry. ¥
Accordingly, for each c ∈ [a; b), there is an m such that the network
is stable (and efficient) for exactly m but not for m + 1 firms. This m is
determined by the value c ≈ 2δ +∑m−1i=2 δi + δm−12 (wk − 1). In every case this
network comprises the key-player as a central firm in a symmetric fraction of
the circle. The intuition for the definition of the two threshold values a and b
is as follows: in case of the lower threshold value a we need to ensure that the
smallest possible network is able to adopt without anyone else. For the upper
threshold value b we need to ensure that no departure with everybody else
can be beneficial in the biggest possible network (which is the network that
comprises all n firms). Figure 2 gives a graphical illustration of the stable and
efficient network structures.
This outcome is highly relevant to observations in practice. In the inter-
mediate cost range, peripheral firms which are most distantly located to
the key-player cannot be part of a stable and efficient network, since the
value added (e.g. in terms of know-how on product development or process
9Note, the smallest network is not one that comprises just the key-player and only one
neighbor, since the value of connecting the second neighbor to k given that the other neighbor
is already linked to k has a higher value than the link between k an the first (unconnected)
neighbor.
10This is due to the assumption that wkj > 11−δ − δ. Accordingly, the relevant link is
the link between k and its second neighbor, given the existing link between k and its first
neighbor.
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Figure 2: Stability of network structures dependent on c values
data, or industry knowledge) is not enough to compensate for the costs their
connection to the network would imply (see the appendix for a numerical and
graphical example).
4 Dynamic Network Formation
The n firms are myopic and are supposed to be initially unconnected.11 Time,
T , is divided into periods, being modeled as a countable, infinite set T =
{1, 2, ..., t, ...}. The network that exists at the end of period t is labeled gt
whereas the payoff each firm i receives at the end of t then reads as ui(gt).
In each period, a (potential) link i : i ± 1 between two neighbored firms is
randomly identified to be updated with uniform probability. If the identified
link i : i± 1 ∈ gt−1, both firms i and i± 1 decide whether to sever the link or
not. Otherwise, if i : i± 1 6∈ gt−1, then firm i and i± 1 can form link i : i± 1
requiring that the sum of both firms’ utilities from the link is higher than
its cost. A stable state in the network formation process is reached if after
some time period t, no additional links are formed or broken. Accordingly,
the resulting network must be a stable (static) network. In proposition 2 we
derive what types of network the formation process converges, allowing us
to determine whether or not the formation process converges to efficient and
stable network structures.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the emerging network structures
which are determined in proposition 2.
11See Watts (2001).
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Figure 3: Outcomes of the dynamic network formation process
Proposition 2 The dynamic network formation process converges to the
following network structures:
(i) If c ≤ 2δ, then every link forms (as soon as possible) and remains.
The network converges to the complete ring graph gN .
(ii) If 2δ < c ≤ δ(1 + wk), links form symmetrically around the key-
player (starting with a link between k and one of its two neighbors):
a) in case of 2δ < c ≤ a, the network converges to the complete ring gN ,
b) in case of a < c ≤ δ(1 + wk), the network size reaches m < n members.
(iii) If c > δ(1 + wk), then no links ever form.
Proof. The proof takes into account the results from the proof to Proposi-
tion 1. Dependent on the values of c different links may form. Note that the
lowest net value of a link is 2δ, which is a link between two firms which are
not the key-player. Further,
• if c < 2δ then even this link forms immediately when those two neighbors
are matched. Accordingly, with such a low value for c every link forms.
• If 2δ < c ≤ a, then only a link between the key-player and one of
its neighbors is valuable in the first period. Because c > 2δ, no other
link will be formed in the first period. Due to this argumentation, in
subsequent periods only links to the already existing network, including
the key-player, can be valuable. Since c ≤ a, the cost for a link is low
enough that the network converges to the complete chain.
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• If a < c ≤ δ(1+wk), due to the same argumentation as above, only a link
involving the key-player k and one of its neighbors can be valuable in the
first period. Again, due to c > 2δ, in subsequent periods only links to
the already existing network, including the key-player, can be valuable.
But now, since a < c the network will not converge to the complete ring
graph gN but only to a network including just m < n, determined by
2δ +
∑m−1
i=2 δ
i + δ
m−1
2 (wk − 1) ≈ c.
• If c > δ(1 + wk), then no links can ever form. This is because δ(1 + wk)
is the highest possible value of a first link in the network. This must
be a link between the key-player and one of its direct neighbors. If this
value is lower than the cost c of establishing a link, there is no incentive
to form any link. ¥
Proposition 3 tells us what type of networks the formation process converges
to. This information allows us to determine whether or not the formation
process converges to an efficient network. Each agent prefers a direct link
to any indirect link. In each period, two agents, say i and i + 1, meet. If
players i and i+1 are not yet connected, then they will each gain at least from
forming a direct link; if c < 2δ and so the connection will take place. Using
the same reasoning as above, if an agent ever breaks a direct link, his payoff
will strictly decrease. Therefore, no direct links are ever broken. Proposition
3 says that if 0 ≤ c < a, then the network formation process always converges
to the complete ring network, which is the unique efficient network according
to Proposition 1. This network is also the unique stable network.
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5 Extensions
The basic network model can be extended in various ways. Most common in
the literature is a distinction between two-sided and one-sided knowledge flows
yielding quantitatively slightly differentiated results (see e.g. Bala and Goyal,
2000). Here, we want to focus on extensions, namely the impact of changes in
the bearer of the link cost, of a network congestion cost and of the number of
firms which are involved in the decision of forming a link between two firms.
5.1 Differentiated Distributions of Link Costs
In order to allow for the possibility of interfirm compensation payments, we
thus far considered the joined payoff of the two firms that establish the link
as relevant for the creation of a link. But we also observe other forms of
distributing the cost burden of link creation among players.
Joining firm bears total linking cost
In electronic business relationships, often the joining firm has to bear the total
cost burden to get linked to a network alone. Accordingly, the most distant
firm to k will only join the network if its net payoff is positive. Compared
to the scenario where the two connecting firms share the cost, the identified
threshold values a and b now change to a’ and b’ as follows:
a’ = δ +
n−1∑
i=2
δi + δ
n
2 (wk − 1) (4)
b’ = δ(wk + δ). (5)
Since a’<a and b’< b it follows that when the joining firm has to fully bear c,
the crucial cost value to ensure a stable and efficient network where all n firms
participate has to be lower than in the basic model. Further, for the interme-
diate cost values c ∈ [a’;b’] the number of m firms for which the network is
stable and efficient tends to be lower than in the basic model. This outcome
is due to the fact that in this scenario there is no possibility of interfirm com-
pensation between link-establishing firms.
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Joint pairwise stability vs. pairwise stability
The common stability concept in the extant literature is that of pairwise sta-
bility by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), which is a more narrow concept than
joint pairwise stability since it does not allow for the possibility of compensa-
tion payments between link establishing partners. Pairwise stability is defined
as follows:
Definition 2 (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996)
A network g is pairwise stable if
(i) ∀ij ∈ g, ui(g) ≥ ui(g − ij) and uj(g) ≥ uj(g − ij)
(ii) ∀ij 6∈ g, if ui(g) < ui(g + ij) then uj(g) > uj(g + ij).
This definition considers only the individual benefits of two link-establishing
firms. In can easily be shown that in comparison to the notion of joint pairwise
stability, the threshold cost value for stable networks is lower when we apply
the notion of pairwise stability. That means, with pairwise stability some
networks are efficient but not stable, whereas they are stable and efficient
under joint pairwise stability.
5.2 Network Congestion
Instead of modeling a link creation cost that has to be incurred by (at most)
the two firms between which the link is created, we now introduce a network
congestion cost. That is, with every joining member there arises a cost c′ to
all existing network members in terms adjustment costs to the new member or
increased administrative effort, for example. This network congestion cost is
modeled as an alternative cost to the link-establishing cost c from above, such
that the utility of a player i from the network g denotes as:
ui(g) =
 δlikwk +
∑
j 6=i δ
lij − (n− 1)c′, for i 6= k∑
j 6=i δ
lkj − (n− 1)c′, for i = k
(6)
where n represents the cardinality of g. Accordingly, the higher the number
of network members, the greater becomes the interest of network members
to prevent further firms to join. Furthermore, the decision to accept a link
between a network member and a firm outside the network could also be
influenced by all existing members of the network. Especially when network
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congestion costs are present, such a scenario is highly relevant to practice. In
such a case the stable and efficient network size is smaller than in the case
with only link-establishing firms being involved in bearing the cost burden of
a new link.
6 Conclusion
The recent advances of information technology have brought about many or-
ganizational changes for firms in always faster changing markets. Together
with a reduction in the frequency of hierarchical coordination and increasing
fragmentation of value chains, we observe a flattening of vertically integrated
organizations. Furthermore, networks as a form of coordination alongside mar-
kets have become increasingly common, especially in the electronic business.
Recently, organizations have moved beyond customer/supplier relationships
to begin to establish alliances with their direct and closely related industry
competitors. Typically, these inter-firm alliances take the form of formal or-
ganizational partnerships, which are of growing importance in the context of
electronic business networks. Such competitor alliances formerly focused ex-
clusively on specific joint product development efforts, but tend increasingly
to long-term basic research and development collaborations.
The present paper contributes to the theory of network formation by in-
troducing three aspects which are especially observable in electronic business
networks. First, we account for the fact that a crucial feature of such elec-
tronic business networks is the participation of so-called “key-players”, which
are crucial value enhancers in value chains or precursors in product develop-
ment alliances, for example. Accordingly, we account for heterogeneity among
firms’ information contribution to networks. Key-players provide higher lev-
els of knowledge than ordinary firms, which could be tier 2 suppliers in value
chains or followers in R&D development consortia. Second, in our model, firms
can only connect to their direct neighbors but not to more distant players. This
assumption reflects the peculiarities of electronic business networks where it
is not necessarily required that every network member has a direct link to all
other participants in order to guarantee knowledge exchange flows between
all participants. A further intuition behind this assumption is that distances
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are interpreted in terms of similarities in business activities. That means if
a firm intents to join a network it has to incur costs (e.g. adjustment costs
for its database, training of personnel) in order to sample a neighbor which is
member of the network. On the other hand, the existing network has to incur
corresponding adjustment costs. The utility from a connection to a direct in-
dustry competitor might be higher than the utility from a very distant network
member say from another industry. Third, we introduce network congestion
costs into a model of network formation. A joining member imposes costs
on all existing network members in terms of increasing communication costs
or adjustment costs causing a firm’s effectiveness at managing its alliances to
decline with the number of alliances maintained.
Furthermore, through the definition of jointly pairwise stability, we ex-
tend the common notion of pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) by
providing a concept that allows for interfirm compensation payments. Addi-
tionally, this concepts eliminates the shortfall of pairwise stability with regard
to the existence of efficient but non-stable networks. Indeed, in electronic as
well as in non-electronic business relationships, we observe that many (big)
firms subsidize their suppliers (or as well customers) to get them connected to
a network or R&D cooperation.
The present paper can by extended by generalizing the concept of joint
pairwise stability to a concept of joint m-wise stability, meaning that we con-
sider not only the payoffs of two link-establishing players but of all the players
which are already in the existing network. A further extension is to generalize
the model for arbitrary network structures, where the basic concept of jointly
pairwise stability should also hold when we introduce a key-player. This will
be taken up in future research.
Appendix
Example: A Network with n = 12 potential Members
For illustrative purposes consider an exemplary network with n = 12 potential
members. Let δ = 0, 300 and wk = 1, 730 then it follows, that in this setup, a
= 2δ +
∑n−1
i=2 δ
i + δ
n
2 (wk − 1) = 0, 909 and b = δ(1 + wk + δ) = 0, 729. The
16
If c ∈ g stable & efficient for m
firms, with m =
[0, 909;∞) 0
[0, 791; 0, 909) 3
[0, 748; 0, 791) 5
[0, 734; 0, 748) 7
[0, 730; 0, 734) 9
[0, 729; 0, 730) 11
[0, 000; 0, 729) n = 12
Table 1: c−ranges for stable and efficient networks with m firms
Figure 4: # of m firms for which the network is stable and efficient, given c
calculated ranges for c so that the network is only stable for m < n firms are
shown in table 1 above. Accordingly, in the middle ranges for c, i.e. between
a and b, the network is stable and efficient for only m < n firms, leaving
peripheral firms out of the network. Figure 4 shows the relationship between
the cost to establish a link between two neighbored firms and the number of
firms for which the network is stable and efficient. The vertical axis shows
the ranges for c in which the network is stable for exactly m firms, e.g. for
c ∈ [0, 791; 0, 909); this is the case for m = 3 firms. If c > b = 0, 909 the
empty network is the only stable and efficient network; if c < a = 0, 729, this
is the case for all n = 12 firms.
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